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Abstract—Navigating security and privacy challenges is one of
the crucial requirements in the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) network.
Since Electric Vehicles (EV) need to provide their private in-
formation to aggregators/servers when charging/discharging at
different charging stations, privacy of the vehicle owners can be
compromised if the information is misused, traced, or revealed.
In a wide V2G network, where vehicles can move outside of
their home network to visiting networks, security and privacy
becomes even more challenging due to untrusted entities in the
visiting networks. Although some privacy-preserving solutions
were proposed in literature to tackle this problem, they do
not protect against well-known security attacks and generate a
huge overhead. Therefore, we propose a mutual authentication
scheme to preserve privacy of the EV’s information from aggre-
gators/servers in the home as well as distributed visiting V2G
networks. Our scheme, based on a bilinear pairing technique
with an accumulator performing batch verification, yields higher
system efficiency, defeats various security attacks, and maintains
untraceability, forward privacy, and identity anonymity. Per-
formance analysis shows that our scheme, in comparison with
existing solutions, generates significantly lower communication
and computation overheads in the home and centralized V2G
networks, and comparable overheads in the distributed visiting
V2G networks.
Keywords—authentication, bilinear pairing, privacy-preserving,
security attacks, V2G;
I. INTRODUCTION
In the future, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system is expected to
be one of the most powerful systems in the smart grid by
integrating with renewable energy sources to provide ancillary
services, and keeps track of the power demand utilized by
the Electric Vehicles (EV)/Battery Vehicles (BV). These ve-
hicles can communicate with the smart grid under distributed
and/or centralized V2G networks for charging/discharging their
batteries from/to the grid. To support V2G communications,
a Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) standard
protocol is specifically designed for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) that includes IEEE 802.11p
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and IEEE 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) [1].
Several parties have significant interest in exploring the
possibilities of the V2G operations, such as vehicle supplier,
vehicle battery supplier, vehicle owner, Electric Vehicle Supply
Equipment (EVSE) owner, business/home users, aggregation
service provider, and electrical utility [2]. In addition, US
Department of Defense also has significant interest in V2G.
Regulatory and governmental agencies also have particular
motivations for investigating V2G. It is expected that in
the future, V2G will assist both, Plug-in Electric Vehicle
(PEV) and renewable energy to increase market penetration.
Furthermore, V2G can also provide peak power and cost-
benefit, as currently meeting the demands of peak power is
a very expensive obligation for utilities. It can also provide
the operating reserve, which is available online within a short
time in case of any disruption to the electricity supply.
V2G communication system is different from other existing
communication systems in several aspects, such as vehicle
mobility, geographical location of the vehicle, charge and dis-
charge operations, driving pattern, and limited communication
range. Non-cooperative (individual benefit of selfish EV) and
cooperative (overall benefit of the connected EV) optimization
approaches are used to optimize charging of EV’s battery under
uncertain demand [3]. It takes almost 10 hours to charge a
15-kWh battery using a standard 120-volt outlet [4]. In terms
of security, authentication in the V2G network needs to be
fast and efficient in order to support a large number of EVs
expected to participate in dynamic charging/discharging [5].
Also, confidential information like vehicle identity, vehicle
type, charging and discharging time, and Charging Station
Identity (CSID) needs to be protected.
A. Research Challenges
EVs perform charge and discharge operations in order to
meet their energy demand and to balance the power in the grid.
In the centralized V2G network, where the power is directly
supplied to the grid, vehicles can only perform discharge
operation [6], [7], [8], [9]. This power is absorbed by the
smart grid and is supplied to the areas where balancing of
power-demand is required. In the distributed V2G network,
vehicles perform local charge and discharge operations, and
the power is only used within the local area to fulfill the
power demand. The local area where a vehicle is registered
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is commonly referred as its home area, and outside this area
is referred to as its visiting area. A distributed V2G network
consists of home as well as visiting V2G networks, while a
centralized V2G network is considered as visiting network for
all the vehicles [6], [10].
In the V2G network, an EV is connected to a Charging
Station (CS) for charging/discharging its battery. The EV
provides variety of information to the CS, such as its identity,
State of Charge (SoC), desired SoC, and charging/discharging
preferences [11]. The Local Aggregator (LAG) collects infor-
mation from the connected vehicles and forwards some of the
information to the Control Center (CC) for monitoring and
billing purposes. However, it is possible for the LAG to reveal
and misuse this information for its benefit [6], [11].
There exist various security and privacy challenges in the
V2G system that can massively affect practical usage of this
next generation technology [12]. The information shared by
the EVs and other V2G entities, such as LAG, Certifica-
tion/Registration Authority (CA/RA), and CC must be secured
over the network, and privacy of the personal and confidential
information must be maintained. According to IEC 15118-2
[13], only unilateral authentication (server side authentication)
is mandatory and mutual authentication (both server and EV
authentication) is optional. However, unilateral authentication
is not considered secure, as it may result in redirection and
impersonation attacks. It is risky to assume that all the LAGs
and/or CA/RAs are trusted entities. As a point of strong security
in the future generation V2G network, we strongly emphasize
that the V2G system must provide mutual authentications
between all EVs and their respective LAGs or CA/RAs in
order to ensure the communication involvement only by the
legitimate entities. Furthermore, the LAG must not be able to
recognize and keep track any EV by its information and behav-
ioral pattern. Otherwise, the LAG can misuse the information
resulting in insider attacks.
The existing protocols/schemes do not discuss some of
the possible attacks in the V2G network, such as Man-in-
the-Middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, redirection, known
key, and repudiation attacks. Furthermore, there is always
a possibility of insider attacks. Moreover, protection of pri-
vate information of the vehicles and resistance against secu-
rity attacks are more challenging outside of its home V2G
network, as the vehicles may also interact with untrusted
LAGs and/or CA/RAs. Also, since a huge number of entities
would be involved in the future distributed and centralized
V2G networks, the generated overheads must be kept as
low as possible. These overheads have direct impact on the
optimal performance-security trade-off. Therefore, a secure,
lightweight, and privacy-preserved authentication scheme for
the home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks is needed.
B. Security Goals and Requirements in the V2G Networks
There are various security goals and requirements in the
V2G network, such as authentication, forward secrecy, in-
formation confidentiality, and message integrity. The V2G
network also suffers from various security attacks due to its
connectivity with Internet. We define the security properties in
the V2G network as follows:
1) Authentication: Authentication is one of the mandatory
requirements that enables communication between legitimate
entities, and defeats impersonation attacks.
Definition 1: A mutual authentication holds if (i) the EV
successfully verifies the LAG and/or CA/RA, and (ii) the EV
is also verified by the LAG and/or CA/RA before the actual
communication starts. The computed secret parameters must
be verified by the involved entities.
EV | ≡ LAG| ≡ CA/RA→ EV | ≡ LAG∧EV | ≡ CA/RA.
2) Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS): At any stage of the
scheme, adversary A is allowed making a query to learn
information about an unexpired secret key. A guesses whether
the learned challenge is a true session key or a random key.
Definition 2: A scheme maintains PFS if no adversary A
in time t can retrieve the past session keys k, even the long
term keys LTK (i.e., the private key of the vehicle or a session
key) are compromised, when (i) entities involved in the session
compute same key, and (ii)A wins if its output bit b′ is equal to
a randomly chosen bit b selected in query. A, running against
the scheme, has negligible advantage as
Advpfsk,LTK(A) = Pr[b = b
′
]− 1/2.
3) Information Confidentiality: Each encrypted message in
the V2G scheme must provide enough security to be indis-
tinguishable from a randomly generated message, considering
adversary A has access to an encryption oracle that encrypts
messages chosen by A’s without knowing the secret key.
In other words, the scheme must support Indistinguishability
under the Chosen Message Attack (IND-CMA).
Definition 3: A scheme is IND-CMA secure if no adversary
AEnck(.) in time t can distinguish between two chosen mes-
sages msg0 and msg1, and has no or negligible advantage.
Advind−cmaEnck (A) = Pr[AEnck(.)(msg0) = 1]−
Pr[AEnck(.)(msg1) = 1] ≤ .
4) Message Integrity: Integrity of each message can be
achieved using a well known Collision-Resistant Hash Func-
tions (CRHF).
Definition 4: H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (m<n) is a collision-
resistant hash function if it there exists a negligible function
 such that for all security parameters n ∈ N,
Pr[(msg0,msg1)← A(1n, h) : msg0 6= msg1 ∧
h(msg0) = h(msg1)] ≤ (n).
The advantage of A in breaking H under security notion
bhf ∈ {collision, preimage, second-preimage} is given by
AdvbhfH (A) = Pr[msg0 6= msg1 and H(msg0) = H(msg1)].
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C. Privacy Requirements in the V2G Networks
The privacy of the EVs must be preserved whenever EVs
access charging stations. Revealing vehicle’s identity to A
results in privacy breaches, in which A can track the behavior
of the victim vehicle, and performs some unwanted activities,
such as linking messages to extract partial secret information
of the victim, and retrieving personal and location information.
The vehicle’s private information, such as its location and
battery status should not be revealed during the authentication.
For example, the LAG should not be able to retrieve the
location of the EV making a request. Similarly, the LAG must
not be able to track the EV based on its battery status. The
required information should directly be sent to the intended
recipient in a secure manner. Furthermore, the LAG must
be unaware of the EV’s timing selection and the choice of
operation. Similarly, the LAG must not be able to track the EV
based on other operational information like CSID. We define
the following privacy properties in the V2G networks:
Definition 5: (Vehicle Untraceability and Information Pri-
vacy): Vehicle untraceability is maintained if A cannot distin-
guish whether two generated messages (with pseudo-identity
and/or vehicle’s location, battery status, selection of charg-
ing/discharging, and expected time information), say msg0
and msg1, correspond to same or two different identities of
the vehicles, say ID0 and ID1. The game is over once A
announces its guess of the selected message. A scheme satisfies
untraceability if A cannot select the correct message with
probability higher than that of random guessing. We also define
forward and backward vehicle untraceability.
• Forward untraceability is maintained if A cannot deter-
mine whether a vehicle at time tfrw (tfrw > tcurrent)
will be involved in communication based on current
derived information.
• Similarly, backward untraceability is maintained if A
cannot determine whether a vehicle at time tbrd (tbrd <
tcurrent) was previously involved in communication.
Definition 6: (Forward Privacy): Forward privacy is sim-
ilar to untraceability with additional capability that one of
two Pseudo-Identity (PID) messages and/or {vehicle location,
battery status, selection of charge/discharge, expected time}
messages information is given to A. Clearly, now A can
trace the vehicle’s identity and/or other information. However,
forward privacy is maintained if A is still unable to trace
previous sessions (without giving a secret or session key).
Definition 7: (Vehicle Identity Anonymity): In the V2G net-
work, anonymity is maintained if only the sender (vehicle)
and the intended receiver (registration authority) can know the
actual identity of the vehicle, i.e., EV(ID) PID↔ CA/RA(ID).
Note that vehicle’s (i) anonymity and (ii) untraceability
guarantee that besides the vehicle and the registration authority
∈ {home, centralized} V2G networks, no one including the
aggregator ∈ {home, visiting, centralized} V2G networks: (i)
can figure out the identity of the vehicle, and (ii) is able to
identify previous sessions involving that vehicle, respectively.
D. Our Contribution
We make the following main contributions by extending
our work in [10] (considers only home V2G network) by
including visiting and centralized V2G networks for charg-
ing/discharging. Our scheme:
• Provides mutual authentications between the EV and
the LAG (in the home and visiting V2G networks), and
between the EV and the CA/RA (in the home, visiting,
and centralized V2G networks) so that no malicious
entity can participate over the communicated network.
• Preserves privacy of the EV’s identity, location,
charge/discharge selection, expected time, battery status,
and other personal information in the home as well
as visiting V2G networks. Each EV’s identity is well
protected in all three networks. It also ensures that
the LAG and adversary A cannot trace and extract
information regarding EV’s behavior pattern.
• Generates lower communication overhead (by transmit-
ting limited information) and computation overhead (by
reducing the pairing, exponential, and scalar multiplica-
tion operations) than existing schemes in [16] and [7]
in the home as well as centralized V2G networks. In
the visiting V2G network, computation overhead of our
scheme is also better than the scheme in [16], but is
slightly large than the scheme in [7]. For subsequent
authentications, our scheme achieves lower communica-
tion overhead than these schemes.
• Defeats various security attacks, such as MITM, replay,
impersonation, redirection, known key, and repudiation
attacks, and maintains information confidentiality, per-
fect forward secrecy, and message integrity. Our two-
factor authentication scheme also defeats insider attacks,
when a rogue device is installed in the network, and
when a friend of the user tries to connect the vehicle to
the CS for a misconduct on behalf of the user.
• Also maintains vehicle untraceability, forward privacy,
vehicle identity anonymity, and information privacy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
related work with V2G security and privacy issues. Section
III discusses system and attack models in the distributed V2G
network (home and visiting V2G networks) and centralized
V2G network. Our authentication scheme under the distributed
as well as centralized networks is presented in detail in section
IV. The security and performance analysis of the proposed
scheme is evaluated in section V. Finally, section VI concludes
the work. Table I shows various symbols and acronyms used
in the paper with their descriptions and sizes.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, many research works have been performed on
authentication protocols/schemes for the V2G network [5],
[8], [9], privacy preserving authentication [7] and threshold
credit-based incentive mechanism [14], privacy-enhanced data
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TABLE I: Symbols and Abbreviations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
EV Electric vehicle -
LAG Local aggregator -
CA/RA Certification/registration authority -
H() One-way hash function -
ID Identity of the EV 128
PID Pseudo-identity of the EV 128
CSID Charging station identity 128
Γ A public key at CA/RA 128
µ A variable for a product of identities 256
λ A random number generated by CA/RA 128
γ A random number generated by EV 128
ξ A variable for a product of identity 256
δ Signature of the EV 128
r A random number for key label 16
Option request A variable to store selected option 1
Expected time Time duration for charging/discharging 64
Decision Decision to conduct operation 1
k Shared secret key between EV and LAG 128
H/hash Hash value 64
T Timestamp 64
aggregation [15], privacy preserving communication [16], and
virtual ring architecture for smart grid privacy [17]. However,
various possible attacks in the V2G network are still not well
investigated. One of the main reasons that the V2G network
is vulnerable to several security attacks due to enabling IP-
based communications [18]. Also, due to the introduction
of Internet of Things (IoT), where the inter-network traffic
flow is allowed, security of the V2G network will become a
critical issue [19], [20]. In order to keep the system protected
against such attacks, various security and privacy requirements,
such as authentication, secure key management, confidentiality,
message integrity, anonymity, and untraceability need to be
maintained [21], [22], [23].
A threshold anonymous authentication protocol for VANET
is presented in [24], while a threshold anonymous announce-
ment service using direct anonymous attestation and one-
time anonymous authentication protocol is proposed in [25].
However, both protocols are not suitable for the V2G network
due to the dynamic involvement of the EVs. Furthermore,
an Energy Management Framework (EMF) is proposed in
[26] to collect the real-time power consumption status and
demand from the EVs and charging stations. However, the
framework does not discuss its prevention against security
attacks. An authentication scheme in [23] is not comparable
to our scheme, as it neither considers important parameters
in the V2G network, such as battery status and time to
charge/discharge, nor discusses its prevention against security
attacks. A study was performed for making a reservation on
charging stations via VANET [27]. However, the drawback is
to include a trusted authority that verifies the vehicle’s identity.
The user privacy may not be maintained in such a scenario, if
the entity is malicious or compromised. Also the scheme only
provides unidirectional authentication to verify the vehicles
by the authority, which may lead to an impersonation attack.
Further, a secure and privacy-aware fair billing framework is
proposed for an online EV to move through charging plates
installed under the road [28]. However, the scheme does not
consider discharging of the vehicle. In addition, the idea of
installing charging plates under the road is in the early phase
and requires a huge setup cost.
A role-dependent privacy-preservation scheme (ROPS) [8]
uses three BV roles, i.e., energy demand, energy storage, and
energy supply. Similarly, a battery status-aware authentication
scheme [9] uses charging, fully charged, and discharging status
of the battery. Further, an aggregated-proofs based privacy-
preserving authentication scheme (AP3A) [7] achieves secure
identification of the BV by verifying a group of EVs and estab-
lishing an aggregated-proof. However, all protocols/schemes
generate huge overheads and do not entirely fit in the V2G
network where a fast and efficient authentication is required.
A batch authentication protocol (UBAPV2G) [5] takes into
account the vehicle communication in order to provide au-
thentication in the V2G network. However, the scheme is just
a variant of standard DSA algorithm and does not consider
the important aspects in the V2G network, such as privacy-
preservation of vehicle’s sensitive information, prevention
against various security attacks, and key management for se-
cure communication. Privacy of the users and communication
security of the smart grid are studied in [15] where a batch-
oriented power-usage data aggregation scheme for the smart
grid is proposed. However, the scheme discusses a generic
adversary model without any security attack scenario, and does
not provide mutual authentication. Further, a precise reward
scheme for the V2G network [16] provides privacy protection
by verifying the generated permit and rewarding the BVs
later when they wish to disconnect. However, the scheme
generates a large overhead. Moreover, to protect sensitive
energy usage information of the user, a privacy protection
scheme is proposed in [17]. However, the scheme is only for
the smart grid, not directly applicable to the V2G network. In
summary, with the best of our knowledge, one of the major
limitations of the existing schemes/protocols is that they do
not present security attacks scenarios in the V2G networks and
most of them generate a huge overhead.
III. SYSTEM, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY MODELS
This section presents an overview of our V2G system model,
and the Strand Space model, and discusses security and privacy
attacks model.
A. System Model
Consider a V2G system model as shown in Figure 1, which
includes distributed as well as centralized V2G networks. In the
distributed network, a vehicle can also move to visiting V2G
network for charging/discharging. On the other hand, a vehicle
can only discharge its battery in the centralized V2G network.
Our system has three main entities: EVs, LAGs, and CA/RAs.
An EV can charge/discharge its battery any time at any CS.
An LAG is an entity located between the CC or CA/RA and the
CS. We call them, Home-LAG, Visiting-LAG, and Central-LAG,
respectively, in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G net-
works. A CA/RA is a trusted certification/registration authority
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Fig. 1: V2G system model: a common architecture for the distributed V2G network (consisting of one home V2G network and
multiple visiting V2G networks), and centralized V2G networks.
that maintains a database containing information of various
EVs and LAGs. We call them Home-CA/RA, Visiting-CA/RA,
and Central-CA/RA in the home, visiting, and centralized V2G
networks, respectively. We assume that the LAG is curious
about the EV related information. Each EV first registers itself
to its Home-CA/RA by specifying the Home-LAG of its area.
An EV charges/discharges its battery from a group of charg-
ing stations connected to a LAG, and a number of LAGs are
connected to a single CA/RA based on the capacity of CA/RA to
handle EVs’ requests. As an example, we consider that a single
Home/Visiting-CA/RA is responsible for four Home/Visiting-
LAGs in the home as well as visiting V2G networks. For
the centralized V2G network, one Central-LAG is connected
to the Central-CA/RA as shown in Figure 1, but in reality,
there can be a number of Central-LAGs connected to the
Central-CA/RA. All the CA/RA are further connected to the CC
through wireless/wired communication. The communications
between the CS and a LAG, and between a LAG and a CA/RA
are enabled through wireless networks. The communication
between the EVSE and the Electric Vehicle Communication
Controller (EVCC), and between the EVSE and the load
balance controller at CC are governed by ISO/IEC 15118-2
[29] and IEC62056 with EV extensions [30], respectively.
B. Adversary Model: Security and Privacy Attacks
The strength of adversary A is defined by the set of
oracles that it can access and is allowed to query. A weak
adversary never corrupts the message, while a destructive
adversary may corrupt the message at any time. In addition, a
strong adversary may corrupt the message at any time without
destroying the message. We consider a strong adversary in
our attack model. In our attack model, an outsider attacker
may perform MITM attack between an EV and a LAG. The
attack is successful if A retrieves message information using
Enck(.)/Deck(.) over the unencrypted or weak encrypted
network. A can also perform a replay attack if it delays
(Treceive = Tsend + Tprop time + Tattack) or repeats the
transmitted message (msg ∈ OLD MSG) to the EV/LAG
over the network, where Tcurrent > Told msg . A can perform
integrity violations if it modifies the transmitted messages
over the network, such that msgreceive 6= msgsend. A can
also initiate an impersonation attack if it pretends itself as
one of the EVs/LAGs involved in the communication, such
that EV = A−EV or LAG = A−LAG, and EV k⇔ A−LAG
or A−LAG k⇔ EV. In addition, A can execute repudiation
attack, in which acting as an EV it denies after sending a
message (msg) to the LAG such that the EV either owns a
valid message (msg) proof received by LAG, or the LAG has
received msg by the EV and owns a valid proof. Also, A may
generate future session keys based on the current session key
(keyfuture = f(keycurrent)), resulting in a known key attack.
In our privacy model, original identity of EVs must be
protected. Otherwise, A (or even the LAG) can extract personal
information of the users by tracing their behaviors. In a
computational environment, privacy properties are typically de-
fined by means of games. We consider untraceability, forward
privacy, and anonymity properties in our privacy model. We
assume that A can eavesdrop communications and can also
query all the messages in the beginning. Then, A chooses
a message msg randomly from a set and makes a query. A
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can break untraceability if it can detect the selected message
msg with probability {Pr < guessrandom}. Furthermore, A
may perform backward and forward untraceability, in which
the internal state of the EV (such as identity) is known to A,
and based on the information derived in current session, it can
determine whether a particular EV was involved in the past and
future subsequent communications, respectively. Moreover, A
can also break forward privacy and anonymity by tracing the
previous sessions and actual identity of the EV, respectively.
C. Strand Space Model for Protocol Security
We define the protocol as a sequence of events for each role
of the EV, LAG, and CA/RA using Strand Space model [31].
A strand s represents a sequence of actions of an instance of
a role. A is a set of the elements terms, which are possible
messages that can be exchanged between the EV, LAG, and CA
in the protocol. A strand space is a set Σ with a trace mapping
tr : Σ→ (±A)∗, where 〈send, a〉 and 〈receive, a〉 are signed
terms as 〈+a〉 and 〈−a〉, respectively, and (±A)∗ is a set of
finite sequence of signed terms. Furthermore, a bundle C =
(NC , E), which is a subgraph of N , represents the protocol
execution under some configuration, where E ⊆ (→ ∪ ⇒) is
a set of the edges and NC ⊆ N is a set of nodes incident
with the edges in E. A node is a pair 〈s, i〉 with s ∈ Σ and i
an integer satisfying length(tr(s)), and is denoted as n ∈ s.
Also, assume T ∈ A is the set of atomic messages, m ∈M is
a Text term, k ∈ K is a Key term, inverse of symmetric key k
is k−1, and KA is a key space of the keys known to adversary
A.
IV. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
This section presents a preliminary discussion on bilinear
pairing as well as proposes an authentication scheme in the
home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks. We assume that
each EV has a tamper-proof device that is responsible for all
cryptographic-related computations, such as storage of secret
keys and algorithms, generation of Pseudo-Identities (PIDs) of
EVs, and encrypting and signing the messages.
A. Preliminaries
Preliminaries include our bilinear pairing technique and
dynamic accumulator.
1) Bilinear Pairing: We define the bilinear pairing of our
system as follows:
Definition 8: Let G1 and G2 be cyclic multiplicative groups
of prime order p generated by g1 and g2 for which there exists
an isomorphism ϕ : G2 → G1 such that ϕ(g2) = g1. Consider
P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2. Let GT be a cyclic multiplicative group
with the same order p where e: G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear
pairing with the following properties:
Properties: (i) Bilinearity: e(Pa, Qb) = e(P, Q)ab, ∀P ∈ G1, Q
∈ G2 and a,b ∈ Z∗p.
(ii) Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1
(iii) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(P, Q), ∀P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2.
Domain of hash functions are as follows: H1 : G1 ×
{0, 1}∗ × Z∗p → G1, H2 : GT × {0, 1}∗ × Z∗p → GT , H3 =
H(f1) = H(f2) : G1×G2 → GT , H4 = H(QS) : Z∗p×G2 →
G2. Various input parameters of each hash function (including
integer modulo prime p and elliptic group) are converted in bit-
string, and then it produces 256-bit output by SHA256 [32].
Further, we define a bilinear pairing instance generator that
takes a security parameter l as input and returns a uniformly
random tuple t = (p, G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2) of bilinear pairing
parameters such that p grows exponentially with l.
2) Accumulator from Bilinear Pairing: An accumulator is a
one-way function that verifies whether a candidate is a member
of a given set without revealing the identity of other members
in a set. We define a dynamic accumulator for our system. Let
N be the set of positive integers.
Definition 9: An accumulator is a tuple ({Xl}l∈N, {Fl}l∈N),
where {Xl}l∈N is the value domain of the accumulator, and
{Fl}l∈N is a sequence of the families of pairs of functions
such that each (f, g) ∈ Fl is defined as f : Uf × Xextf → Uf
for some Xextf ⊇ Xl, and g : Uf → Ug is a bijective function
[33], [34]. The following properties are satisfied:
Properties: (i) Efficient Generation: There exists an efficient
algorithm that takes a security parameter l as input and outputs
a random element (f, g) ∈R Fl with auxiliary information β.
(ii) Quasi Commutativity: For every l ∈ N, (x1, x2) ∈ Xl,
u ∈ Uf : f(f(u, x1), x2) = f(f(u, x2), x1). The g(f(u,X))
is computable in polynomial time in l, even without the
knowledge of β, where X = {x1, ..., xq} ⊂ Xl.
B. Our Scheme in the Home V2G Network
We present the details of our scheme including initial setup,
EV registration, and scheme execution, as shown in Figure 2.
In our scheme, a dynamic accumulator is used by the Home-
LAG and the Home-CA/RA in order to verify whether an EV
belongs to a set of all registered EVs at that point of time.
Further, a bilinear pairing map is used to generate a shared
secret key between the EV and the Home-LAG. This key
is used for all subsequent authentications within a session.
In addition, a hash of signatures are used to provide non-
repudiation and confidentiality of the transmitted messages.
1) Initial Setup: All EVs, LAGs, and CA/RA (in all three
networks) randomly generate their private keys as SEV, SLAG,
SCA ∈R Z∗p, and further compute their public keys as QEV =
gSEV2 , QLAG = g
SLAG
2 , and QCA = g
SCA
2 , respectively, where g2 ∈
G2. These public keys are stored in an off-line key repository.
Further, we define (f, g) ∈ Fl as g(f(g2, PID)) where PID =
{PID1, PID2, ..., PIDq} is a set of pseudo-identities of the EVs.
Consider f : Zp × G2 → G2, g : G2 → Zp, f : (g2,PID) 7→
PID.H(σCA-LAG), g : g2 7→ g2/H(σLAG-CA), where signature
σCA-LAG is computed at CA/RA as (QLAG)SCA , while σLAG-CA is
computed at LAG as (QCA)SLAG .
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EV Home-CA/RA
αi∈ Z∗p, computes Γi=gαi1
Registration{ (1) : IDi,Γi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B stores Γi(2) : PIDiC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− generates PIDi
Home-LAG Home-CA/RA
CA/RA-LAG Communication{ (3) : µ′ , λC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− computes periodically µ′(4) : PIDj, rj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B removes PIDj , and
stores rj in the database
Protocol Execution
EV Home-LAG Home-CA/RA
xj ∈ Z∗p, γj = gxj1 (5) : γj,PIDj,T1,H1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B checks H1 ?= H
′
1
ξ=g
∏
i PIDi/PIDj
2 =g
∏
i,i6=j PIDi
2
checks H2
?
= H
′
2
(6) : H(f1), λ, ξ,Ek[rj],T2,H2C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− computes f1=e(g
µ
′
1 , g
H(σLAG)
2 )
f2=e(g
(PIDj)
H(σEVj
)
1 , ξ)
checks H(f1)
?
=H(f2),
computes δj (7) : Ek[δj,T3], rj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B decrypt δj
(8) : (γj, δj,PIDj,Tj).H(Q
SLAG
CA )−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i γi.(g
PIDi
1 Γi)
λ
commandC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− commandC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(9) : M
′
i ,T4−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(9) : M
′
i ,T4−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(10) : Decision.H(QSCAEVj),T5C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(10) : Decision.H(QSCAEVj),T5C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2: Proposed scheme for the V2G smart grid network.
2) EV Registration: First of all, each EVi has to register
itself with the Home-CA/RA of its home area. This registration
can be done either by physically reaching Home-CA/RA or
remotely using a pre-shared login credentials. Each EVi gener-
ates a random secret αi ∈R Z∗p and computes Γi = gαi1 ∈ G1.
Thereafter, the EVi submits its original identity IDi to the
Home-CA/RA along with Γi. This αi is used by the EVi for
its signature generation during its request to the Home-LAG.
Msg-(1): EVi → Home-CA/RA: {IDi, Γi}
The Home-CA/RA stores its IDi, generates a pseudo-identity
of the EVi, i.e., PIDi, using a pseudo-random function [35],
and sends it to the EVi.
Msg-(2): Home-CA/RA → EVi: {PIDi}
After each successful registration of a new EVj , the Home-
CA/RA computes µ = (
∏
i6=j PIDi).H(σCA-LAG).PIDj , where∏
PIDi is the product of all PIDs of registered EVs. Similarly,
once the session expires for an EVi, its PIDi is removed
from the database at Home-CA/RA and then the Home-CA/RA
recomputes µ. Hence, registration process creates a dynamic
accumulator that supports efficient evaluation, efficient addi-
tion, and efficient deletion of an EVi. We define our dynamic
collision resistant accumulator with the following properties:
Definition 10: EV’s Evaluation: Consider a set of pseudo-
identities PIDs of various registered EVs as {PID1, PID2, ...,
PIDi}. The Home-CA/RA computes µ =
∏
i PIDi that maps
g(f(g2,PID)) as
∏
i PIDi.
Definition 11: EV’s Addition: The Home-CA/RA computes
µ = g(f(g2,PID)) considering PIDi ∈ PID, PIDj 6∈ PID,
and g(f(g−1(ξ),PIDi)) = µ. When a new EVj is registered,
the updated µ is computed as µ
′
= g(f(g2,PID
⋃{PIDj}))
= µ.PIDj . Here, the value ξ
′
is such that µ
′
=
g(f(g−1(ξ
′
),PIDi)) where ξ
′
= ξ.PIDj . The ξ is a witness for
the fact that PIDi ∈ PID has been accumulated in µ whenever
g(f(g−1(ξ),PIDi)) = µ.
Definition 12: EV’s Deletion: The Home-CA/RA com-
putes µ = g(f(g2,PID)) considering PIDi, PIDj ∈ PID,
PIDi 6= PIDj , and g(f(g−1(ξ),PIDi)) = µ. After per-
forming operations by the EVj within a session, its PIDj
must be deleted and the updated µ is computed as µ
′
=
g(f(g2,PID\{PIDj})) = µ/PIDj . Here, the value ξ′ is such
that µ
′
= g(f(g−1(ξ
′
),PIDi)), where ξ
′
= ξ/PIDj .
3) Home-CA/RA and Home-LAG Communication: When-
ever a new EVj is registered at Home-CA/RA, the Home-
CA/RA updates the Home-LAG by transmitting updated µ, i.e.,
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CA/RA
LAG1
µ
′
1
λ1
<
LAG2
µ
′
2 λ2∨
LAG3
µ
′
3
λ3 >
µ
′
4
λ4 >
LAG4
Fig. 3: The Home-CA/RA periodically transmits µ
′
and λ to
different LAGs associated with it.
µ
′
as µ
′
.H(σCA-LAG) where a signature σCA-LAG = (QLAG)SCA .
The Home-CA/RA also generates a random λ ∈ Z∗p for each
associated LAG and sends it (only first time) to the respective
LAG. On receiving, the Home-LAG extracts µ
′
using its sig-
nature’s hash as µ
′
/H(σLAG-CA), where σLAG-CA = (QCA)SLAG .
Msg-(3): Home-CA/RA → Home-LAG: {µ′ , λ}
As shown in Figure 3, the Home-CA/RA sends a unique
λi ∈ Z∗p to each associated LAG along with updated µ
′
of
the registered EVs served by the respective LAGs. During first
authentication, a shared secret key k is generated at EVj and
Home-LAG. For all the subsequent authentication requests, the
EVj sends Ek[PIDj ,Tj ] to the Home-LAG as message (7) in
our scheme (discussed in the next subsection). After expiry of
session time, the Home-LAG discards session key k and sends
corresponding PIDj and recently received rj to the Home-
CA/RA. On receiving, the Home-CA/RA deletes PIDj of the
EVj from its database and stores rj to the database.
Msg-(4): Home-LAG → Home-CA/RA: {PIDj , rj}
4) Scheme Execution: Whenever an EVj wishes to
charge/discharge its vehicle’s battery, it generates a random
xj ∈R Z∗p and computes γj = gxj1 ∈ G1. Thereafter, the EVj
sends γj to the Home-LAG along with its PIDj , a timestamp
T1, and a hash value H1 = H(γj ,T1,PIDj).
Msg-(5): EVj → Home-LAG:{γj ,PIDj ,T1,H1}
On receiving message (5), the Home-LAG verifies H1
?
= H
′
1
and extracts µ
′
as µ
′
.H(σCA-LAG)/H(σLAG-CA), where signature
σCA-LAG = (QLAG)SCA and σLAG-CA = (QCA)SLAG . Thereafter, the
Home-LAG computes ξ as ξ = g(
∏
i PIDi)/PIDj
2 . It is worth to
note that PIDi also includes PIDj , as it is a registered EV.
Hence, ξ = g
∏
i,i6=j PIDi
2 , which ensures that the EVj belongs
to µ
′
and thereby the EVj is authenticated by the Home-
LAG. This process can be achieved in a batch of multiple
EVs that send their PIDs to the respective LAG. Next, the
Home-LAG computes f1 as f1 = e(g
µ
′
1 , g
H(σLAG)
2 ) and sends
(H(f1), λ, ξ, T2,H2) to the EVj where λ was received from
the Home-CA/RA, H(σLAG) = H(Q
SLAG
EVj ), rj ∈ Z∗p is a random
number, and H2 = H(f1, λ, ξ, rj ,T2).
Msg-(6): Home-LAG→ EVj : {H(f1), λ, ξ,Ek[rj ],T2,H2}
On receiving message (6), the EVj verifies H2
?
= H
′
2,
computes f2 as f2 = e(g
(PIDj)
H(σEVj
)
1 , ξ) where H(σEVj ) =
LAG1 LAG2 LAG3LAG4
CA/RA
γ2 δ2∨
γ3
δ3<
γ1
δ1 >
γ4
δ4
<
4∑
i=1
4∏
j=1
g
δj
1 =
4∑
i=1
4∏
j=1
γj .(g
PIDi
1 Γj)
λi
Fig. 4: Verification of the EVs at Home-CA/RA by the infor-
mation received from different LAGs.
H(Q
SEVj
LAG ), and checks whether H(f1)
?
= H(f2). If f1 = f2 = k
(shared secret key) holds, the Home-LAG is authenticated by
the EVj . The rj is associated with session key k at Home-LAG
and this key can be used for further communications within a
session. The Home-LAG keeps PIDj in its database until the
expiry (session time) of the key k. Further, the EVj computes
δj = xj + λ(αj + PIDj) and sends it to the Home-LAG.
Msg-(7): EVj → Home-LAG:{Ek[δj ,T3], rj}
After receiving message (7), the Home-LAG sends
(γj , δj ,PIDj) to the Home-CA/RA signed by H(Q
SLAG
CA ).
Msg-(8): LAG→ CA/RA:{(γj , δj ,PIDj , Tj).H(QSLAGCA )}
Message (8) may contain information of multiple EVi
associated with that Home-LAG. It may also be the case where
different LAGs send message (8) simultaneously (or in a very
short time) to the Home-CA/RA. Hence, it is recommended that
the Home-CA/RA authenticates these requests in a batch for
better efficiency. First, the Home-CA/RA separates out requests
that belong to each LAG using λ and H(QSCALAG), and then
verifies all the EVs in a batch corresponding to each LAG
by verifying
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i γi.(g
PIDi
1 Γi)
λ.
If it holds, all EVi are successfully verified. Otherwise, one
or more EVi are invalid. In such a case, invalid requests need
to be located and removed from a batch. Then, a re-batch
verification is performed. The detection of invalid requests can
be performed using a divide and conquer approach described
in [36]. Similarly, different LAGs connected to a Home-
CA/RA send the received EVi’s information to the respective
Home-CA/RA, and the Home-CA/RA verifies all the requests
© Charging © Discharging
Wisely Choose Time Duration
©10 min. ©1 hr. ©5 hrs. ©9 hrs.
©20 min. ©2 hrs. ©6 hrs. ©10 hrs.
©30 min. ©3 hrs. ©7 hrs. ©11 hrs.
©45 min. ©4 hrs. ©8 hrs. ©12 hrs.
Fig. 5: Charging and discharging time selection window.
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EV Visiting-LAG Home-CA/RA
(via Visiting-CA/RA)
computes hash1 = H(Γb) (1) : hash1, rj,b−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
(1) : hash1, rj, b−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B verifies rj , hash
′
1 = H(Γ
b),
compares hash1
?
=hash
′
1
hash2
?
=hash
′
2,
(2) : hash2, c, yC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(2) : hash2, c, yC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− hash2 = H(Γ
c),
(PIDj , rk) = y/H(Q
SEVj
CA )
y = (PIDj , rk).H(QSCAEVj )
Fig. 6: Pre-phase of our scheme for vehicle mobility in the V2G visiting area network via Visiting-LAG and Visiting-CA/RA.
as shown in Figure 4. After successful authentication, the
Home-CA/RA sends a command that opens a window for all
EVi to select charging/discharging duration as illustrated in
Figure 5. The smart grid’s CC computes power supply and
demand load based on the operation selected by all EVi. All
the EVi preferences are captured in a message Mi where
Mi = (PIDi,CSID,Option request,Expected time). Here,
Option request has two options, one is request for charging
and other is request for discharging. Each EVi computes M ′i
as Mi.H(Q
SEVi
CA ) and sends it to the Home-CA/RA.
Msg-(9): EVi → Home-CA/RA:{M ′i ,T4}
On receiving message M ′i , the Home-CA/RA retrieves the
original message Mi from the received message as Mi =
M ′i/H(Q
SCA
EVi). The Home-CA/RA sends a One Time Password
(OTP) to the EVi for its identity verification. Thereafter, the
Home-CA/RA asks to the CC to compute the power based on
charging/discharging request by the EVi. Further, it computes
dynamic power load and announces its decision of allowing
charging/discharging decision, i.e., Decision, to the EVi.
Msg-(10): Home-CA/RA→ EVi : {Decision.H(QSCAEVi),T5}
Finally, the EVi performs required operation based
on the decision received from the Home-CA/RA as
Decision/H(Q
SEVi
CA ). We have shown Decision.H(Q
SCA
EVj
) for
EVj in Figure 2. After completion of the desired operation
by the EVi, the Home-CA/RA sends required information to
the CC for billing purposes.
For all subsequent requests within a valid session of the
key k, the EVj sends message (7) as {Ek[PIDj ,Tj ], rj} to
the Home-LAG. On receiving the message, the Home-LAG
decrypts the message using a session secret key k identified
by rj and verifies PIDj . If it is valid within a session,
the LAG sends a verification command with H(QSLAGCA ) to
the Home-CA/RA. In addition, the Home-LAG sends a new
random r
′
j as Ek[r
′
j ] to the respective EVj . The EVj sends
next authentication request along with this number so that the
Home-LAG can extract respective session key of the EVj . The
Home-CA/RA extracts verification command using H(QSCALAG)
and sends a command to open a selection window for the EVj .
Thereafter, the scheme executes message (9) and message (10)
as it is. After session expiration of the key k, the Home-LAG
discards k and sends its related PIDj and rj to the Home-
CA/RA, which then removes PIDj and stores rj to the database.
C. Our Scheme in the Visiting V2G Network
In a more realistic V2G scenario, the vehicle may also move
outside of its registered home V2G network to a visiting V2G
network. Hence, we extended our scheme by considering the
visiting V2G network. As shown in Figure 6, the vehicle has to
execute a pre-phase before being mutually authenticated with
the Visiting-LAG. In detail, mutual authentications between the
EV and the Visiting-LAG, and between the EV and the Visiting-
CA/RA are achieved by carrying out the following steps:
Step-1: Pre-phase: First, the EVj selects a random number
b ∈R Z∗q and computes a hash hash1 = H(Γb). Thereafter, it
sends hash1, rj , b, and its Home-CA/RA to the Visiting-LAG,
which is then transmitted to the Visiting-CA/RA in a secure
manner using their public and private keys. This exposes the
identity of Home-CA/RA to which the EVj belongs to. How-
ever, it is still very difficult to recognize the actual identity of
the EVj . Furthermore, the Visiting-CA/RA transmits hash1, rj ,
and b to the respective Home-CA/RA. Here, rj is the latest
number stored in the database with respect to corresponding
EVj (message (4) in Figure 2) that helps the Home-CA/RA to
retrieve the EV’s identity and public key QEVj .
Msg-(1): EVj → Home-CA/RA:{hash1, rj , b}
On receiving message (1), the Home-CA/RA verifies the
received rj , retrieves Γj , computes hash
′
1 = H(Γ
b), and
compares hash1
?
= hash
′
1. If it is true, the Home-CA/RA
computes hash2 = H(Γc) and y = (PIDj , rk).H(Q
SCA
EVj ), where
c, rk ∈R Z∗q and PIDj is a new random pseudo-identity
generated by the Home-CA/RA. Finally, it sends hash2, c, and
y to the EVj .
Msg-(2): Home-CA/RA→ EVj : {hash2, c, y}
When message (2) is received by the EVj , it computes hash
′
2 =
H(Γc) and compares hash2
?
= hash
′
2. If it is true, the EVj
retrieves PIDj and rk from y as PIDj = y/H(Q
SEVj
CA ).
Step-2: The Home-CA/RA sends PIDj and Γk = grk1 to the
Visiting-CA/RA. Thereafter, the Visiting-CA/RA sends updated
µ
′
=
∏
i PIDi to the Visiting-LAG, where PIDi includes PIDj .
Step-3: Once PIDj is received by the EVj , the scheme
continues from message (5) in Figure 2. Following points
highlight differences with the home V2G network scheme:
1. The public and private keys of the Visiting-LAG are used
(instead of Home-LAG) for computing signatures σLAG and
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EV Central-LAG Central-CA/RA
(1) : PIDj,T6,H3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B checks H3
?
= H
′
3
(2) : λ
C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− random λ is broadcasted to all EVs
rl ∈ Z∗p,
computes δj
(3) : (δj, rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ),T7,H4−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B verifies H4
?
= H
′
4
(4) : (PIDj, (δj, rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ), λ).H(Q
SLAG
CA )−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i .Γi(g
PIDi
1 )
λ
verifies rl (5) : (rl).H(Q
SCA
EVj)C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(5) : (rl).H(Q
SCA
EVj)C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 7: Proposed scheme for EV’s discharging in the V2G centralized network.
σEVj between the Visiting-LAG and the EVj .
2. The EVj computes δj = xj +λ(rk + PIDj) in message (7).
3. The public and private keys of the Visiting-CA/RA are used
(instead of Home-CA/RA) for computing QSLAGCA in message (8),
and Q
SEVj
CA and Q
SCA
EVj in messages (9) and message (10).
4. The Visiting-CA/RA uses Γk received from the Home-CA/RA
for the respective EVj by verifying all EVi in a batch.
5. When the scheme run is over, the Visiting-LAG sends recent
rj to the Home-CA/RA via Visiting-CA/RA to store it.
D. Our Scheme in the Centralized V2G Network
We consider that a centralized V2G network covers multi-
ple geographical locations, and the EVs can discharge their
batteries to the grid, but cannot charge from it. Having such
a centralized V2G network enables transmission of power
directly and immediately to the smart grid. In a later time,
this stored power can be supplied to other locations where
power is urgently needed. In order to attract the EVs for
discharging their batteries, a reward scheme can be considered.
In fact, an EV can be paid relatively better while discharging
via centralized V2G network rather than via distributed V2G
network. Since only discharging can be performed in the
centralized V2G network, the EVs can be paid on the spot with-
out generating their bills at later stage. Mutual authentication
between the EV and the Home-CA/RA via Central-CA/RA, and
retrieving PIDj and rk are achieved through a similar process
described in Figure 6. Furthermore, a session key does not
need to be provided to the EVs for discharging their batteries.
This will save time and power of the system when connecting
and disconnecting vehicles frequently. The verification of all
EVi signatures are performed in a batch.
As shown in Figure 7, the EV’s discharging scheme under
the centralized V2G network executes the following steps:
Step-1: After receiving PIDj from the Home-CA/RA, the
EVj sends its PIDj , T6, and H3 to the Central-LAG, where
H3 = H(PIDj ,T6).
Msg-(1): EVj → Central-LAG:{PIDj ,T6,H3}
Step-2: On receiving message (1), the Central-LAG com-
putes H
′
3 and checks whether H3
?
= H
′
3. If it is true, it
broadcasts a random number λ ∈ Z∗p to all EVs that are
requesting for discharge within a very short period of time so
that all requests can be verified in a batch at Central-CA/RA.
Msg-(2): Central-LAG→ EVj : {λ}
Step-3: After receiving λ, each EVj generates its signature
δj as δj = rk + λ.PIDj and a random number rl ∈ Z∗p.
Thereafter, the EVj sends (δj , rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ), T7, and H4 to
the Central-LAG, where H4 = H((δj , rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ),T7).
Msg-(3): EVj → Central-LAG:{(δj , rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ),T7,H4}
Step-4: The Central-LAG computes and compares H4
?
= H
′
4.
If it is true, it sends ((δj , rl).H(Q
SEVj
CA ),PIDj , λ).H(Q
SLAG
CA ) to
the Central-CA/RA.
Msg-(4): Central-LAG → Central-CA/RA: {(PIDj , λ,
(δj , rl). H(Q
SEVj
CA )).H(Q
SLAG
CA )}
Step-5: On receiving message (4), the Central-CA/RA com-
putes and compares
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i Γi.(g
PIDi
1 )
λ. Here, Γi in-
cludes Γk = grk1 that was sent from the Home-CA/RA to the
Central-CA/RA for each EVj .
Step-6: The CA/RA sends an acknowledgment message to
each authenticated EVj as (rl).H(Q
SCA
EVj ).
Msg-(5): Central-CA/RA→ EVj : {(rl).H(QSCAEVj )}
On receiving, each EVj retrieves and verifies rj by comput-
ing H(Q
SEVj
CA ). Once it is verified, the EVj starts discharging
its battery to the smart grid. After process completion, the
Central-CA/RA sends rl to the Home-CA/RA to store it.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents computation proofs, as well as security
and performance analysis of our scheme.
A. Computation Proofs
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme in the home and visiting
V2G networks generates a shared secret key k between the
EVj and the Home/Visiting-LAG.
Proof: Generation of a shared secret key k:
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Key kLAG at Home/Visiting-LAG: f1 = e(g
µ
′
1 , g
H(σLAG)
2 ),
=e(g
∏
i PIDi
1 , g
H(σLAG)
2 )
=e(g1, g
H(σLAG)
2 )
∏
i PIDi
Key kEVj at EVj : f2 = e((g1)
PID
H(σEVj
)
j , ξ),
where H(σEVj ) = H(Q
SEVj
LAG )
=e((g1)PID
H(σEVj
)
j , g
∏
i,i6=j PIDi
2 )
=e(g1, g
H(σEVj )
2 )
∏
i PIDi ,
since e(P a, Q)=e(P,Qa)=e(P,Q)a, and H(σLAG)=H(σEVj ).
In a similar way, the other EVs can generate a shared secret
key with their respective Home/Visiting-LAG.
Theorem 2. If all the requests are made by the legitimate
EVs to the respective LAG, the CA/RA verifies all the requests
correctly. The LAG refers all types of local aggregators, i.e.,
Home-LAG, Visiting-LAG, and Central-LAG.
Proof: Batch verification at Home/Visiting-CA/RA in the home
and visiting V2G networks:
R.H.S. =
∏
i(g
PIDi
1 )
λ(γi)(Γi)
λ =
∏
i(g
λPIDi
1 )(g
xi
1 )(g
αi
1 )
λ
=
∏
i g
xi+λ(αi+PIDi)
1
L.H.S.=
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i g
xi+λ(αi+PIDi)
1
Hence,
∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i γi.(g
PIDi
1 Γi)
λ is true. The proof for∏
i g
δi
1 =
∏
i Γi.(g
PIDi
1 )
λ batch verification at Central-CA/RA
in the centralized V2G network can be similarly derived.
B. Security Analysis
In this subsection, authentication, session key establishment,
and privacy-preservation of the proposed scheme are discussed
along with prevention against different security attacks.
Property 1. The proposed scheme provides mutual authenti-
cations between the EVj and the LAG in the home and visiting
V2G networks. It is also provided between the EVj and the
Central-CA/RA in the centralized V2G network.
In the home and visiting V2G networks, the LAG authenti-
cates the EVj by verifying ξ = g
(
∏
i PIDi)/PIDj
2 , and each EVj
authenticates the LAG by comparing H(f1)
?
= H(f2). Further,
the original message M can only be extracted by the CA/RA
with QEVj and SCA. Similarly, Decision can only be retrieved
by the EVj with SEVj and QCA. In the centralized V2G
network, Central-CA/RA authenticates the EVj by verifying its
signature. Also, the EVj verifies rl and confirms authentication
with the Central-CA/RA. In other words,
∀C.LAG(−→x ) ∈ C ⇒ EVj(−→x ) ∈ C, and
∀C.CA(−→y ) ∈ C ⇒ EVj(−→y ) ∈ C,
where −→x and −→y are bindings (verification information in
messages (6) and (10)) to complete the protocol run by
EVj − LAG and EVj − CA, respectively.
Property 2. Adversary A cannot extract secret session key
k over the network. Furthermore, perfect forward secrecy is
maintained by our scheme in the V2G network.
Each session secret key is used for authentications between
the EVj and the LAG in the home as well as visiting V2G
networks, and is actually never sent over the network. There is
no such requirement in the centralized V2G network. Further-
more, even if A is allowed to access private key of the EV, it
cannot generate past session keys, as these keys are generated
using (µ
′
, SLAG, QEVj ) and (PIDi, ξ, SEVj , QLAG). Clearly,
past PIDi are not valid in the current session. Moreover, old
PIDi are no longer part of µ
′
and ξ. Therefore, A cannot
retrieve the past session keys. Furthermore, if k−1EVj 6∈ KA,
k−1LAG 6∈ KA, and Ti is uniquely originated in Σ, then for all
m ∈ C, Ti 6= term(m).
¬∃C.(LAG(−→x ) ∧ CA(−→x ) ∈ C ∧ EV(+SoC) ∈ C),
where −→x is the response received by the EVj to complete the
protocol run (messages (6) & (10) in Figure 2 and messages
(2) & (5) in Figure 7).
Property 3. Adversary A cannot gain non-negligible advan-
tage by performing chosen message attack in the V2G network.
Also, A cannot compromise message integrity.
In our scheme, encrypted message (6) and message (7)
generate different ciphertexts even by using same session key.
The LAG generates each PID using a secure and efficient
pseudo-random function [35]. Moreover, encryption of unique
rj in message (6) and signature in message (7) are performed
by the LAG and EV, respectively, using AES-CTR that encrypts
and decrypts the successive values of a counter (ctr) with AES
as C[0]← ctr; P [i]← Fk(ctr + i); C[i]← P [i]⊕M [i]; and
ctr ← C[0]; P [i] ← Fk(ctr + i); M [i] ← P [i]⊕ C[i], where
C[i], P [i], M [i], and Fk() are ciphertext, plaintext, message
block to be processed, and a function to process ctr, respec-
tively. A cannot distinguish between such streams of equal
lengths. In fact, encrypting two distinct ctr using AES-CTR
obtain two distinct values, and hence, it is indistinguishable.
Our scheme provides integrity protection by using hash
values with each transmitted message over the network. Here,
hash function H : A → A, and H(M) = H(M ′) ⇔
M = M
′
, M,M
′ ∈ A, where strand with trace for EVj ,
LAG, and CA are 〈+H1,−H2,+hash1,−hash2,+H3,+H4〉,
〈−H1,+H2,−H3,−H4〉, and 〈−hash1,+hash2〉, respec-
tively. If A intentionally changes any message, the received
and computed hash values will not match at the receiver,
and the connection will be terminated. Furthermore, a hash
of the key, instead of the actual session key, is sent over
the network. We use SHA256 hash function (where possible
hash codes m = 2256 with n-bit message), which is still
considered collision resistant. The probability of successful
attack on SHA256 is as follows:
Pr ≈ 1− exp
(
−n(n− 1)/2
2256
)
≈ 1− exp
(
1
2
( n
2128
)2)
Hence, the probability of successful attack is negligible as
long as 2128 values of hash are used.
Property 4. Our scheme defeats impersonation, MITM,
replay and injection, and redirection attacks over the network.
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Our scheme defeats the following security attacks:
a. Impersonation Attack: Adversary A must know IDj
and/or session key of the victim EVj in order to perform this
attack. However, A cannot obtain secret shared key. There are
two possible cases of this attack as follows:
• Case-1: A impersonates the EVj: A uses a fake PID as
PIDl with a hash A-H1. Obviously, PIDl 6= PIDj , and
LAG rejects the request and terminates the connection.
• Case-2: A impersonates the LAG: The rogue A-LAG
would not be able to retrieve correct µ
′
, as H(QSA-LAGCA ) 6=
H(QSLAGCA ). Furthermore, H(f1) 6= H(f2) at EVj . Hence,
the EVj terminates the connection. A similar case exists
in the centralized V2G network where the private key of
the Central-LAG is different than A-LAG’s key.
b. MITM Attack: A may try to secretly build a connection
between two communicated parties with the following cases:
• Case-1: Key-exchange by A: A cannot establish a con-
nection with the EVj and the LAG, as it cannot compute
H(QSLAGEVj ) or H(Q
SEVj
LAG ). Also, it cannot compute correct
H(QSCA/RAEVj ) or H(Q
SEVj
CA/RA) between the EVj and the
CA/RA. Further, A cannot generate correct f1 or f2.
• Case-2: A as a rogue LAG or a friend: A may install a
fake A-LAG, extracts information provided by the EVj
and later uses it to access the system from a valid LAG.
Moreover, a friend who has an access to the vehicle
and knows security key may perform various unintended
tasks. In order to prevent such access, after receiving the
message from the LAG, the CA/RA sends an OTP to the
EVj’s owner for identity verification. Hence, two-factor
authentication prevents the system against a rogue LAG:
one by sending an OTP and other by verifying PIDj .
• Case-3: A tries to extract secret information: A may
also try to extract information from message (7). A
neither can decrypt the message as it cannot generate
k, nor can retrieve the private keys of the EVj , LAG,
and CA/RA. Hence, A cannot perform MITM attack.
c. Replay and Injection Attacks: A can intercept, inject,
or re-send messages in order to perform replay attacks. Our
scheme resists replay attacks by using timestamp values in
all transmitted messages between the EVj and the LAG. If A
replays a previous message or injects information to a message
at Ti, legitimate LAG, CA/RA, and EV discard the message if
Ti + Tthreshold ≤ Tcurrent, where Tthreshold is the threshold
value of the propagation time between two entities.
d. Redirection Attack: In the home and visiting V2G net-
works, each EVj sends CSID to the Home/Visiting-CA/RA.
Home/Visiting-CA/RA verifies the location of each EVj by
matching received information from the EVj with the stored in-
formation. If they do not match, Home/Visiting-CA/RA discards
the connection. Furthermore, there is no such requirement for
the centralized V2G network, as it allows only discharging of
the battery, and each EVj is paid on the spot.
TABLE II: Comparison of Security and Privacy Goals
Goals
[16] [7] [8] [9] [15] [5]
Our
Scheme
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Identity protection Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Message integrity Yes No No No No No Yes
Replay attack Yes No No No No Yes Yes
MITM attack Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
Redirection attack Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Impersonation attack PartialNo No No No No Yes
e. Other Attacks: Our scheme also prevents Known Key at-
tack in the home and visiting V2G networks, as each secret key
k is different and is newly generated for each session between
the EVj and the Home/Visiting-LAG. Also, the identity and
hash-signature verification prevents Repudiation attack.
Table II summarizes security and privacy goals achieved by
various schemes, and our scheme fulfills all such goals.
Property 5. Adversary A cannot compromise privacy of the
vehicle, as our scheme maintains anonymity, untraceability,
and forward privacy.
Privacy of each EVj is protected during authentications over
the network. Each EVj’s PIDj , which is initially generated by
the Home-CA/RA, is actually sent only once over the network.
After each session, the EVj requests for a new PIDj to the
Home-CA/RA. Similarly, in the visiting and centralized V2G
networks, the actual identity of each EVj is well protected.
We quantify the anonymity provided by PIDi in terms of the
advantage of A for correctly guessing the challenge bit.
Definition 13: (Indistinguishability under Anonymous Iden-
tity (IND-ANO)): Our scheme is IND-ANO as no adversary A
at time t can distinguish between the two chosen identity PID1
and PID2 with negligible  advantage.
Pr[A(PID1) = 1]− Pr[A(PID2) = 1] ≤ .
If EVj is a vehicle of EV strand s and fun(C) = EV, where
fun is an evaluation function of bundle C.
For ∀u ∈ U, if fun(C) = u, then ∀EV ∈ U/{u},
where U is an anonymity set. Also,
if ∃CEVj satisfies fun(CEVj ) and CEVj ∼= C,
the protocol of bundle C preserves sender anonymity. Our
scheme maintains anonymity, as the actual identity is only
known to EVj and CA/RA. The intermediate LAGs believe on
only the facts (identity set) provided by the CA/RA.
Definition 14: (Untraceability): Our scheme satisfies un-
traceability as A cannot distinguish whether two PIDs cor-
respond to the same EV or two different EVs.
Verif(publicChannel)[(ID1, ID2)|PIDi|EV|CA/RA]
≈ Verif(publicChannel)[ID1|ID2|PIDi|EV|CA/RA].
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Our scheme transmits PIDj instead of the original identity
over the network. Even if A retrieves a PIDj and makes
a query from random oracle to generate several PIDj from
IDj , A cannot conclude which IDj matches with the retrieved
PIDj , as a unique PIDj is generated using a pseudo-random
function. Furthermore, our scheme generates a new key for
each session based on the unique PIDj . Therefore, linkability
to previous sessions is not possible. Also, by holding the gen-
erated identities and messages during the current session (say
time t), A cannot determine whether these messages belong
to a particular vehicle after tfrd, as each PIDj is independent
and is deleted by CA/RA after each authentication. Similarly,
A cannot know whether these messages were generated by a
particular vehicle before tbrd, as each session’s identities, keys,
and messages are independent.
Definition 15: (Forward Privacy): Our scheme satisfies for-
ward privacy as A is allowed to trace the EV in the current
session, but it cannot trace information related to the previous
scheme sessions. In other words,
Verif(publicChannel)[(ID1,PID2)|PIDi|EV|CA/RA]
≈ Verif(publicChannel)[PID1|PID2|PIDi|EV|CA/RA].
We also consider forward privacy scenario, where even if A
is given a breakable ID1, A cannot trace PID1, as the identity
is generated by a secure pseudo-random function. Also, the
location of each vehicle is unknown to the LAGs, as it can
only access PIDi, and not IDi. Furthermore, each session
protects secret keys by PFS. Therefore, our scheme maintains
anonymity, untraceability, and forward privacy properties.
C. Performance Analysis
The performance of our scheme is evaluated in terms of
communication and computation overheads. We compare our
scheme (home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks) only
with the schemes presented in [16] and [7]. Others are not
comparable since the scheme presented in [15] does not
provide mutual authentication and is vulnerable to attacks. The
scheme in [5] is not fit to the V2G network, as it does not focus
on vehicle behavior and V2G security and privacy features.
The schemes proposed in [8] and [9] are the extended works
of the scheme in [7], which has a huge overhead. We did not
consider the overhead generated by the schemes in [8] and [9]
since they generate even greater overheads.
i) Communication Overhead: Communication overhead is
the total number of bits transmitted over the network during the
TABLE III: Communication Overhead (in bits)
Overhead P 2 AP3A Our Scheme
[16] [7] Home Visiting Centralized
Initial
authentication
3392 3264 2993 3649 1728
Subsequent
authentication
3392 3263 737 737 1728
scheme execution. As shown in Table III, the overhead of our
scheme in the home V2G network for initial and subsequent
authentications are 2993 bits and 737 bits, respectively, which
is lower than the existing schemes [16] and [7]. In detail, if we
assume that there are n number of EVs that are requesting for
authentications simultaneously, the total communication cost
(for the first attempt) of our scheme in the home V2G network
would be 2993×n. Also, if we assume that r number of
authentication requests are allowed by each EV to the CA/RA
within a session. For subsequent authentications, our scheme
generates 737×r communication overhead while the existing
schemes (with no session) in [16] and [7] generate 3392×r and
3264×r, respectively in the home V2G network. Our scheme
is efficient in terms of communication overhead, as fewer
parameters are required to send over the network. We also
compute the communication overhead for our scheme under
the visiting and centralized V2G networks. We analyzed that
our scheme in the visiting V2G network generates 3649 and
737 bits for initial and subsequent authentications, respectively,
while it is 1728 bits for an authentication in the centralized
V2G network. Our scheme is always better in the home as
well as centralized V2G networks in comparison with other
schemes. Moreover, our scheme is also efficient in all the
networks for subsequent authentications.
ii) Computation Overhead: We compute the computation
overhead as presented in Table IV for n-EVs simultaneously
requesting for authentications. In the home V2G network,
the total computation cost for schemes in [16], [7], and
our scheme are 76×n, 49×n+5, and 39×n+16, respectively.
Assuming a unit value for each operation, our scheme is more
efficient than the existing schemes. The actual computation
time by each scheme depends on the actual time taken by each
operation. The lower overhead is achieved by reducing pairing,
exponential and scalar multiplication operations, and utilizing
hash-based signatures. Furthermore, the computation overhead
incurred by our scheme under the visiting and centralized
V2G networks are 53×n+16 and 38×n+5, respectively, outper-
forming the scheme in [16]. Although, it generates a slightly
TABLE IV: Computation Overhead
Operations P 2 AP3A Our Scheme
[16] [7] Home Visiting Central.
Pairing 19×n – 2×n 2×n –
Exponential 14×n 12×n 9+11×n 9+17×n 3+13×n
Scalar mul-
tiplication
28×n n 1+8×n 1+10×n 10×n
Addition 11×n -3+3×n 2×n 2×n n
Invertible n 2+2×n – – –
Hash (H) 6×n 1+8×n 6+12×n 6+18×n 2+14×n
Auth. code
(HMAC)
7×n 2×n – – –
Encryption/
decryption
– 4×n 4×n 4×n –
XOR – 5+17×n – – –
Total 76×n 5+49×n 16+39×n 16+53×n 5+38×n
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2016.2532840
Copyright (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. , NO. , XXXX 14
higher computation overhead in the visiting V2G network as
compared to [7]. Our scheme always outperforms in the home
as well as centralized V2G networks.
iii) Experimental Setup: We consider a V2G network sce-
nario with an authentication server CA/RA remotely connected
with various LAGs. The specification of our system is 1.70
GHz Core i3-4005U CPU with 4GB RAM and 500 GB
drive. We performed simulation in Java with JDK1.7. We
implemented H1 as SHA256 function, which took 20 millisec-
onds (ms). Further, a pairing function (J-pairing) took 197
ms, while modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication
were executed in 2.1 ms and 0.8 ms, respectively. Moreover,
addition operation, MAC function (HMACSHA256), and AES
with Counter (AES-CTR) encryption and decryption took 0.03
ms, 246 ms, and 0.23 ms and 0.13 ms, respectively. Also, a
simple invertible function executed in 0.8 ms. For a single
authentication, P 2 scheme [16] and AP3A scheme [7] took
5637.93 ms and 680.41 ms, respectively, while our scheme
in home, visiting, and centralized V2G networks took 680.28
ms, 814.48 ms, and 320.33 ms, respectively. Currently, the
average mobile broadband download speed on 4G Long Term
Evolution (LTE) is 10 Mbps [37]. The connection establish-
ment time for each scheme is about 3000 ms, and the total
transmission times for all the messages in each scheme’s initial
and subsequent authentications are computed to be (3000.34,
3000.34) ms, (3000.32, 3000.32) ms, (3000.3, 3000.07) ms,
(3000.36, 3000.07) ms, and (3000.17, 3000.17) ms for P 2
scheme [16], AP3A scheme [7], our scheme in home, visiting,
and centralized V2G networks, respectively. Overall, the total
execution times for a single authentication in P 2 scheme
[16], AP3A scheme [7], and our scheme in home, visiting,
and centralized V2G networks are 8.63, 3.68, 3.68, 3.81, and
3.32 sec., respectively. It is clear that P 2 scheme [16] has
a larger execution time, while our scheme in visiting V2G
network is slightly slow than AP3A scheme [7]. However, our
scheme in home and centralized V2G networks outperforms
other schemes.
D. Security Proof of Our Scheme
We prove the correctness of our scheme using automatic
tool named Proverif. Following are the input and output
observed from Proverif :
free pubChannel : channel.
free secureChannel : channel [ private ].
type key. type msgHdr. type bitstring. type skey. type pkey.
const MSG1, MSG2, MSG3, MSG4, MSG5, MSG6, MSG7, MSG8, MSG9, MSG10,
CMC, MSG: msgHdr.
fun sha256 (bitstring): bitstring.
fun sha2561 (bitstring,bitstring,ident): bitstring.
fun sha2562 (bitstring,bitstring,bitstring,bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun sencrypt (bitstring,key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, k: key;
sdecrypt(sencrypt(m,k),k) = m.
fun pk(skey): pkey.
fun aenc(bitstring,pkey): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, k: skey; adec(aenc(m, pk(k)),k) = m.
fun msg1(bitstring,bitstring,ident,bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun msg2(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun mul(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun sign(bitstring,skey): bitstring.
fun tempid (ident,bitstring): bitstring.
fun e(bitstring,bitstring): key.
fun exp1(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun del(bitstring,bitstring,bitstring,bitstring):bitstring.
fun div(bitstring,bitstring):bitstring.
free s: bitstring [ private ].
query attacker(s).
free Ki: key [ private ].
query attacker(Ki).
not attacker(new IDev).
event begLAG(bitstring,key). event endLAG(bitstring,key).
event begEV(bitstring,key). event endEV(bitstring,key).
event begLAG(msgHdr). event endLAG(msgHdr).
event begEV(msgHdr). event endEV(msgHdr).
query x1: bitstring, x2: key;
event(endLAG(x1,x2)) ==> event(begLAG(x1,x2)).
event(endEV(x1,x2)) ==> event(begEV(x1,x2)).
event(endLAG(MSG)) ==> event(begLAG(MSG)).
event(endEV(MSG)) ==> event(begEV(MSG)).
event enableEnc.
query attacker(s) ==> event(enableEnc).
let processEV =
(* The identity and pre-shared key of the EV *)
new Sev : skey, Qev : pkey, Qlag : pkey, Qca: pkey;
new IDev : bitstring, xev : bitstring, αev : bitstring, g1ev : bitstring, g2ev :bitstring,
T1ev : bitstring, T3ev :bitstring, T4ev :bitstring, T5ev :bitstring, Mev :bitstring;
let σev−lag :bitstring=sign(Qlag ,Sev) in
let σev−ca:bitstring=sign(Qca,Sev) in
let Γev : bitstring=exp1(αev ,g1ev) in
out(secureChannel,(MSG1,IDev ,Γev));
in(secureChannel,(=MSG2,PIDev :bitstring));
let γev : bitstring=exp1(xev ,g1ev) in
let H1ev :bitstring=sha2561(γev ,PIDev ,T1ev) in
out(pubChannel,(MSG5,γev ,PIDev ,T1ev ,H1ev));
event begLAG(MSG6);
in(pubChannel,(=MSG6,HKlag :bitstring,λlag :bitstring,ξlag : bitstring,
EKlag :bitstring,T2lag :bitstring,H2lag :bitstring));
let H2ev :bitstring=sha2562(HKlag ,λlag ,ξlag ,EKlag ,T2lag) in
if H2ev = H2lag then
event endLAG(MSG6);
let tmp1ev :bitstring=exp1(PIDev ,g1ev) in
let tmp2ev :bitstring=sha256(σev−lag) in
let tmp3ev :bitstring=exp1(temp1ev ,tmp2ev) in
let kev :key=e(tmp3ev ,ξev) in
let HKev :bitstring=sha256(kev) in
if HKev = HKlag then
let rev :bitstring=sdecrypt(sencrypt(EKlag ,kev),kev) in
let δev :bitstring=del(xev ,αev ,λev ,PIDev) in
let EKev :bitstring=sencrypt((δev ,T3ev),kev) in
out(pubChannel,(MSG7,EKev ,rev));
(* Command and Operation Selection Window appeared *)
if enableEnc = true then
out(secureChannel,(MSG9,Mev ,T4ev));
(* Receive Decision from CA *)
in(secureChannel,(=MSG10,msg2ca:bitstring,T5ev :bitstring));
let hmsg2ev :bitstring=sha256(σev−ca) in
let decev :bitstring=div(msg2ca,hmsg2ev) in
event endLAG(PIDev ,kev);
let processLAG =
new Slag : skey, Qlag : pkey, Qev : pkey, Qca: pkey;
new g1lag : bitstring, g2lag : bitstring, rlag :bitstring, PIDev :bitstring, γlag :bitstring,
Γev :bitstring;
let σlag−ev :bitstring=sign(Qev ,Slag) in
let σlag−ca:bitstring=sign(Qca,Slag) in
in(secureChannel,(=MSG3, µlag :bitstring, λlag :bitstring));
event begEV(MSG5);
in(secureChannel,(=MSG5,γev : bitstring, PIDev :bitstring, T1ev :bitstring,
H1ev :bitstring));
let H1lag :bitstring=sha2561(γev ,PIDev ,T1ev) in
if H1ev = H1lag then
event endEV(MSG5);
let ξlag :bitstring=exp1(PIDev ,g2lag) in
let tmp1lag :bitstring=exp1(g1lag ,µlag) in
let tmp2lah:bitstring=sha256(σlag−ev) in
let klag :key=e(tmp1lag ,tmp2lag) in
let HKlag :bitstring=sha256(klag) in
let EKlag :bitstring=sencrypt(rlag ,klag) in
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2016.2532840
Copyright (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. , NO. , XXXX 15
let H2lag :bitstring=sha2562(HKlag ,λlag ,ξlag ,EKlag ,T2lag) in
out(pubChannel,(MSG6,HKlag ,λlag ,ξlag ,EKlag ,T2lag ,H2lag));
event beginEV(PIDev ,klag);
in(pubChannel,(=MSG7,EKev :bitstring,rev :bitstring));
let δlag , T3:bitstring=sdecrypt(sencrypt(EKev ,kev),klag) in 0.
let Hlag−ca:bitstring=sha256(σlag−ca) in
let msg1lag :bitstring=msg1(γlag ,δlag ,PIDev ,Tj ,Hlag−ca) in
out(pubChannel,(MSG8,msg1lag));
event endEV(PIDev ,klag);
out(secureChannel,(MSG4,PIDev ,rlag));
let processCA =
new Sca: skey, Qlag : pkey, Qev : pkey, Qca: pkey;
new g1ca: bitstring, Γev :bitstring, PIDev :bitstring, γca:bitstring, µca:bitstring,
IDev :bitstring, λca:bitstring, rca:bitstring, msg1lag :bitstring, T4ca:bitstring,
Mca:bitstring, decisionca:bitstring, T5ca:bitstring, rca:bitstring;
let σca−lag :bitstring=sign(Qlag ,Sca) in
let σca−ev :bitstring=sign(Qev ,Sca) in
in(secureChannel,(=MSG1,IDev :bitstring,Γev :bitstring));
let PIDev : bitstring=tempid(IDev ,Γev) in
out(secureChannel,(MSG2,PIDev));
out(secureChannel,(MSG3,µca,λca));
in(pubChannel,(=MSG8,msg1lag :bitstring));
let Hca−lag :bitstring=sha256(σca−lag) in
let msg1ca:bitstring=div(msg1lag ,Hca−lag) in
(* Extract γlag :bitstring,δlag :bitstring,PIDev :bitstring, Tj :bitstring *)
let δca:bitstring=exp1(g1ca,δlag) in
let PIDca:bitstring=exp1(g1ca,PIDev) in
let PIDmul:bitstring=mul(δca,Γev) in
let PIDmulca:bitstring=exp1(PIDmul,λca) in
let mulca:bitstring=mul(γca,PIDmulca) in
if mulca = δca then
(* Send Command Window to EV *)
in(secureChannel,(=MSG9,Mlag :bitstring,T4lag :bitstring));
(* Compute Supply-Demand and Make a Decision *)
let Hca−ev :bitstring=sha256(σca−ev) in
let msg2ca:bitstring=msg2(decisionca,Hca−ev) in
out(pubChannel,(MSG10,msg2ca));
in(secureChannel,(=MSG4,PIDev :bitstring,rca:bitstring));
(* CA Removes PIDev and Stores rca *)
process
((! processEV) | processLAG | processCA)
Output: Neetesh@Neetesh-PC /proverif1.88
$ ./proverif examples/v2g.pv
– Query attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc)
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker (IDev[!1 =
v 763])
RESULT attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc) is true.
– Query event(endEV(x 1,x 2)) ==> event(begEV(x 1,x 2))
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker (IDev[!1 =
v 1651])
RESULT event(endEV(x 1,x 2)) ==> event(begEV(x 1,x 2)) is true.
– Query event(endLAG(x1 1791,x2 1792)) ==> event(begLAG(x1 1791,x2 1792))
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker (IDev[!1 =
v 2542])
RESULT event(endLAG(x1 1791,x2 1792)) ==>
event(begLAG(x1 1791,x2 1792)) is true.
– Query not attacker(Ki[])
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker (IDev[!1 =
v 3345])
RESULT not attacker(Ki[]) is true.
– Query not attacker(s[])
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker (IDev[!1 =
v 4140])
RESULT not attacker(s[]) is true.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an authentication scheme for
charging/discharging of electric vehicles considering mobility
of the vehicles in distributed as well as centralized V2G
networks. Specifically, our scheme, based on a two-factor
authentication, provides mutual authentications between the
EVs and the CA/RAs (and/or LAGs) in all three networks,
i.e., home V2G network, visiting V2G network, and centralized
V2G network. Our scheme is shown to defeat various security
attacks, including insider attacks, and preserves privacy of
the vehicles by establishing a secure connection to charging
stations. Through comprehensive security analysis, we prove
that our scheme provides resistance against various security
attacks, such as MITM, replay, redirection, impersonation,
known key, and repudiation attacks in the V2G network.
Moreover, our scheme provides perfect forward secrecy, in-
distinguishability under the chosen message attack, message
confidentiality and integrity, untraceability, forward privacy,
and identity and location anonymity. Analytic results show that
our scheme generates lower communication and computation
overheads in comparison with the existing schemes in the home
and centralized V2G networks, and comparable overheads in
the visiting V2G network by sending limited information over
the network. Experimental results show that our scheme in
the home and centralized V2G networks outperform, while our
scheme in the visiting V2G network is slightly slow than AP3A
[7], but is better than P 2 [16].
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